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REMARKS

OF

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AT THE

THIRD AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

8 OCTOBER 1954

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It is a great pleasure to speak about CIA in broad perspective. It has given me an opportunity to sit back and think about the Agency, our relation to other intelligence agencies, the degree of progress we have made, and a few of our weaknesses and a few of our successes.

I would like to discuss what might be called a balance sheet of where CIA stands today. And I might make the general observation that I am afraid most of us in the Agency are too inclined to observe the individual trees and not stand off at a distance and look at the forest. We are so busy with our day-to-day job that people cannot be spared for training; people are always rushing to get to the next job. I would not say this is a criticism of the Agency alone. I think it is an American trait. Americans are always very much in a hurry to get where they are going -- whether it is to the New York subway or to the next job. But it is my worry and concern that we might become so obsessed with the problem of the Soviet Union that we might forget that the Soviet Union might collapse or might become docile or might become democratic. Then suddenly we might be faced with the movement into a power vacuum of great new powers -- new powers which perhaps we had not looked at closely enough -- and we might see, for instance, an alliance of India and China which would be far more terrifying to the world than the Soviet Union is today.

Now I do not want any of you to get the impression that I am looking forward to Malenkov falling on his face at an early date, or to the Russians suddenly becoming the people we want to live with. I do not think either of these is possible. But I do think we can become so obsessed with current problems, with immediate crises, that we stop projecting ourselves far enough ahead to realize that we can move into a country, establish our organization, get set for a crisis now much better than when the country is the major target.

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India, for example, would be far easier to move into and start organizing at the present time than it will be someday when it, with China or alone, becomes a major problem of world security.

With this in mind I would like to point out what I think are three basic and fundamental problems and weaknesses of the Agency and of the intelligence system per se.

The first of our major weaknesses: We are always trying to put out a fire. We are always trying to do more than our capabilities will possibly permit us to do. We are always trying to find answers to the latest crises. We are not looking far enough ahead. We are not establishing what is the most important operational objective of the Agency -- a sound clandestine ground work. There is an illustration from World War II which aptly illustrates this point.

You will recall that the Allied world was shocked when a German submarine sank the battleship, Royal Oak, as she lay at anchor in the British naval base of Scapa Flow. It was almost unheard of to think that the Germans could penetrate this great naval base. How did it happen? Through good intelligence. Because about twenty years before World War II, a small, insignificant watchmaker moved into a house in a village neighboring on Scapa Flow. He was an immigrant from a neutral country. His background appeared perfectly correct. For twenty odd years he sat there making watches and did nothing. In the twenty-first year a radio message was sent to Berlin which described the exact method for penetrating the submarine boom around Scapa Flow. This watchmaker was a German intelligence agent who had been sent in years before. He had waited just for this one opportunity; and when it came, two thousand British sailors went down with one of the biggest battleships in the Royal Navy.

That was a long-term clandestine network. Such a network must be set up in every country in the world. It must be set up on a long-term basis. The persons in it must become so much a part of the landscape and scenery that in times of crisis they can move around, do what they want to do, and nobody will ever think to look in their attic for a radio set or to interrogate them about their background twenty-five years before. We are so busy trying to keep up with current events that the major effort which we should be making to establish that basic network world-wide is not being done the way it should be done. And that is the network which will pay off in times of world crisis. The reason why we are not doing it? We are too susceptible to the demands for current intelligence; now those demands must be met to a degree, but there must be a greater balance between the short-term and the long-term objective.

The second of our major weaknesses -- and it is a deathly trap into which I am afraid we are moving and we must stop moving: Bureaucracy. And I use the term bureaucracy, in this sense, opprobriously. But I want all of you to realize that I consider the

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average government employee, in this or any other Agency, to be a loyal hard-working individual, and I personally resent greatly the attacks so frequently made upon government employees by the Congress and by the Washington press. But we are becoming too bureaucratic. We are getting too imbedded in paperwork. There are times when I think our greatest impact on the Russians could be to bundle up most of our paper and drop it on them -- because I think it would have a much more decisive effect than the actual effect it is having. There is too much paper work, which is done simply because it has been done before and nobody is saying, "Let's stop and look; why are we doing this?" And that is everybody's responsibility. We have an Incentive Award Program so that everybody can participate in it. Look at the piece of paper you are working on. Is it necessary? Is the United States going to stand or fall on it? Or is it being done merely because it has been done for a long time and nobody has stepped in with a razor and cut it down?

The other day it was called to my attention that one clandestine project, originated by a case officer in the field, went through 49 steps before getting approved in Washington. And this project went through 17 steps in getting back to the case officer in the field. If that is true, it is a wonder that we get anything done. And I worry seriously about the security aspects of any project that goes through so many hands. We must start cutting this paper work to a minimum.

The third of our weaknesses is very closely related to the second: Organizationally, we are getting too complex. We have gotten organizationally so complex that by the time instructions get to the agent, it is a wonder they are received correctly, let alone that they ever get to him. We must simplify our organization. We must get more men on the firing lines. We must cut down our Washington headquarters.

Now, it is very easy for the Inspector General to be critical, because I and my staff are the ones who hear all of the bad things. Occasionally we have to look at the good things in order to keep our perspective. So let's look at the good side of the picture.

In the clandestine and psychological warfare field we have achieved some successes which to my mind are absolutely amazing for a young organization, considering its immaturity and professional ignorance. The mission of this kind of warfare is, in simplest terms, to roll back the Iron Curtain. And I could name specific countries where the Iron Curtain has been rolled back or restrained or actually destroyed, so that United States policy and the desire to make the world a better place to live in can be aggressively pursued.

We have also achieved some successes in the clandestine intelligence field. We are still very far from the strength that we should have, but

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we have obtained information on major items which other nations would be most reluctant to know that we have.

On the research side of the house, there has been outstanding progress in the last few years. We know much more about China and its Communist organization than it seemed possible to get from behind the Bamboo Curtain. We are much smarter about the Soviet Union. The current national estimates are truly remarkable considering the fact that four years ago the average estimate went in with three or four different dissents. This to my mind is the closest and surest guarantee that a Pearl Harbor mentality will not resurrect itself in the intelligence organization in Washington. And one intelligence organization does not withhold a pertinent item from another because of jealous prerogatives. That day, I think and hope, has gone forever.

We have developed a very fine communications organization. It can cope with almost any situation. Its value is indicated by the fact that other major government agencies depend on it to a large degree.

And last, but not least, I think the Office of Training has in three years made outstanding progress towards giving you the tools with which to become the best possible intelligence officers.

But, remember, the goal is this. As Americans you like your home, you love your children, you are gregarious, you like sports, you are basically very sympathetic to all other people. Do not fail to see what the basic mission of this organization and the entire intelligence structure is. We are cast out beyond the farthest radar net. We are the first line of defense. If we fail, all of the things that you appreciate and love about this country will be destroyed, because we will be cast into the major war which we want to avoid. The basic objective of this Agency is not war, but peace. And the preservation of peace depends upon the success of our intelligence organization.

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